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IN THE 
·supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
MINTON. W. TALBOT AND THOMAS TALBOT 
v. 
THE CITY OF NORFOLK. 
To the Honorable Judges of the S'upreme Court of Appeals 
of Virgilwia: -
.. 
Petitioners, Minton W. Talbot and Thomas Talbot, here-
inafter often called plainti:ffis, respectfully represent that 
they are aggrieved by a final judgment of the Circuit Court 
of the City of Norfolk, rendered on the 14th day of January, 
1928, in an action of ejectment brought by plaintiffs against 
the City of Norfolk, hereinafter often called defendant, which 
judgment was rendered . in favor of defendant for a very 
valuable piece of land in the City of Norfolk, the case -being 
tried without a jury, as it depended entirely upon points of 
law. A transcript of the record is herewith filed, and the 
original exhibits duly identified, brought up pursuant to 
,statute, to which transcript and exhibits reference is made. 
This is a companion c·ase to that of the same plaintiffs 
against the Virginia Electric & Power Company, and by 
stipulation substantially the same record is used in both cases, 
so that case is referred to, being brought up also here"\tith, 
both cases being intended to be argued together, or" next 
to each other. · · 
THE FACTS are definite, and substantially without dis-
pute, being dependent almost entirely upon documents, and. 
are as follows : 
Plaintiffs' father and predecessor in title, William H. Tal-
bot, by deed dated May 15, 1851 (R. l, Exhibit 1) conveyed 
? 
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to t e Indian Poll Draw Bridge Company a strip of land 30 
feet by 200 feet· as an abutment for a bridge; and 
" lso a tract, piece or parcel of land adjoining thereto & 
cont ining nearly three acres, bounded on the west by the 
said lip of land & the main Road leading to the said Bridge, 
on t e North by the land of William H. Talbot & on the East-
war & Southward by the said Tanner's Creek; as the same 
has een laid off by the company for its uses and purposes 
fore er PROVIDEn NEVERTHJD.LESS, that LF THE 
SAI COMPANY SHALL ABANDON, OR CEASE· TO 
KE P IN USE, ITS BRIDGE FOR THE SPACE OF 
~HR E YEARS, OR SHOULD THE CORPORATE PRIVI-
LEG S OF THE SAID COMPANY IN ANY MANNER 
CEA E, OR BE ABANDONED OR FORFEITED, THAT 
the s id strip of land, & THE SAID TRACT OF: NEARLY 
THR E ACRES, SHALL IPSO FACTO, THEREUPON 
REV RT TO & BELONG TO THE SAID WILLIAM H. 
TA OT, HIS HEIRS OR ASSIGNS." (Caps added.) 
Th s action is brought for the southerly one-half of said 
. 3 acr tract, which defendant holds as successor in title of 
India Poll Draw Briage Company, and plaintiffs' claim as 
succe sors in title of William H. Talbot, being devisees under 
his ll. Both parties derive their title from ·the common 
sourc of William H. Talbot; plaintiffs as the devisees under 
his ll, and pursuant to the condition subsequent expressed 
in· ca itals in the deed of 1851, quoted above ; and defendant 
as sh wn by the exhibits with the record. · 
Th plaintiffs are not making an effort to recover the abut-
ment f the bridge, being willing to let that go for the public's 
needs. 
It as stipulated (R. 11) that this case should be tried 
on th same record as in the companion ca~e of the same 
plaint ffs against the Virginia Electric & Power Company. 
· 'llhe Norfolk Drawbridge Company, which was the last 
holde of the corporate rights and privileges of the Indian 
Poll raw Bridge Company, forfeited its charter in 1922 
(Exhi it 16.) 
The bridge has been operated and controlled by Norfolk 
City a d Norfolk County as a free bridge from 1915 to 1923, 
and b Norfolk City alone from 192:3 to the present as a free 
bridge · . · 
ERROR ASSIGNED IS: That the .Circuit Court 
n deciding for defendant, and ·in entering judgment 
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for defendant, and in not deciding for plaintiffs and not en-
tering judgment for plaintiffs. That the decision and judg-
ment for defendant were contrary to the law and the evi-
dence and without evidence to support the same. 
ARGUMENT. 
This case depends upon questions of law, based on docu-
ments and definite facts. 
Plaintiffs maintain that they are entitled to the land in-
volved in this action by reason of breach of the condition 
.subsequent in the deed of 1851 from William H. Talbot, their 
predecessor in title, to Indian Poll Draw Bridge Company, 
defendant's predecessor in title, and which condition subse-
quent is copied in full on the second page of this petition. 
This condition has been broken in two distinct ways, to-
wit: 
a. Because the Company in 1915 ceased to keep in use its 
bridge and so continued for more than 3 years, to-wit, ever 
since, the bridge having been turned over to Norfolk County 
and Norfolk City, arms of the State, to be operated by the 
State through these arms as a free bridge or public highway, 
and the three years beginning in 1915, the breach of condi-
tion was complete in 1918. 
b. The corporate privileges ceased and were abandoned 
and forfeited by the forfeiture of the Charter of the Norfolk 
Drawbridge Company in 1922. 
Both the breaches of condition subsequent plainly appear 
from the record, and entitled plaintiffs to recover. 
Fortunately, the learned trial Judge ::filed a written opinion, 
where can be definitely shown, we submit, the erroneous prin-
ciples, by which he was guided (R. 15). He was of opinion 
that both the breaches of the condition subsequent had oc-
curred in 1865, the bridge having been burned by the retreat-
ing Confederates in the War Between the States and re-
mained down over three years, etc. (R. 55), that the cause 
of action then arose, and that the action of ejectment could 
then have been brought "and the statute of limitations ran". 
A moment's consideration of t}le law and the evidence will, 
we submit, demonstrate this fundamental error upon which 
the trial court decided. ·· · 
1. For the statute of limitations to run there must be 
-~ -~-----------------~----
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adve se possession for 15 years, while at bar, until recently, 
the p ssession was perfectly consistent with plaintiff's re-
versi nary rights whicli ·were agafn and again recognized. 
For xample, the deed of trust from Tanners' Creek Draw 
Brid e Company to Allyn of 1891 expressly says the con-
veya ce was: · ''Subject to the requirements of the 1851 
deed of William H. Talbot.'' 
2. ven if there had been a breach of the condition sub-
seque t by the bridge remaining down over three years in 
the ar Between the States, William H. Talbot had a per-
fect ight to waive such a breach without relinquishing his 
right to avail himself of subsequent breaches. 
3. ere breach of a condition subsequent does not start the 
statu e of limitations running. The provision in the deed 
of 1 1 was a mere condition subsequent, and not a condi-
tional limitation: • 
Ral igh Minor on Real Property, Section 541. 
Me rs v. Taylor, 142 Va. 824. 
It 's to be noted that this is a CONDITION SUBSE-
QUE T, because the reverter is to the G:RANTOR HIM-
SEL . Had the reverter been to a THIRD PERSON, the 
intere t of the reversioner would have been . a CONDI-
TIO L .LIMITATION. . 
It i necessary to a. proper decision of this case to bear 
this istinction steadily in mind, because, although these 
estate somewhat resemble each other, the principles of law 
beari g on and applicable to these two kinds of estates are 
entire y different, especially the matter of the statute of 
limita ions. For example in the case of a CONDITIONAL 
LIMI ATION, the reversionary. esta~e vests immediately 
in the beneficiary upon the happening of the contingency. 
ears v. Taylor, sttpra, it is ·said at page 832: 
''A condition determines an estate ·after hreach, upon en-
try or claim hy the grantor or his heirs, or the heirs of the 
deviso . A limitation marks the period which determines 
the es ate, without any act on the part of him who has the 
next xpec:tant interest. Upon the happening of the pre-
scribe contingency the estate first limited comes at once to · 
an en , and the subsequent estate arises. · ~ 
''A conditional limitation is therefore of a mixed nature, 
8 
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partaking both of a condition and of a limitation of a con-
dition, because it defeats the estate previously limited; and 
of a limitation, because upon the happening of the contin-
gency, the estate passes to the person having the expectant 
interest, without entry or claim.'' 
And so if the reversioner entitled to an estate, under a 
CONDITIONAL LIMITATION, be kept out of the estate, 
the statute of limitations would begin to run against him 
at once on the happenings of the conting·ency that determined 
the nrevious . estate. On the oth~r hand, in the case of a 
CONDITION SUBSEQUENT the reversionary estate does 
not vest immediately on condition broken, because the law 
allows the perso~ entitled to the reversion the right to elect 
whether he will avail of the forfeiture and take over the 
estate, and he may waive one or more forfeitures in the 
interest of harmony and repose. He has this right as clearly 
under the law itself, as if the deed specifically provided that 
at his election he might re-enter. In case he waives the for-
feiture and does not re-enter, the estate and possession of the 
grantee continues to run on the same, and the status quo ante 
continues, just as if the contingency had not happened at all. 
The forfeiture is not self-executing. 
Pence v. Tidewater, etc., 127 Va. 447. 
F. J. Lowery v. Territory of Hawaii, 215 U. S. 554 (54 
Law Ed. 325). 
1 Warvelle on Vendors, Sections 440 and 446. 
2 Devlin on Deeds, Sections 959 and 97 4. 
In the above cited case of Pence v. Tidewater, it is said 
at page 454. (7-9): 
"The law is stated by Mr. Graves (Sec. 277) (supra), with 
a full citation of the authorities, as follows: Assuming that 
there has been a breach of a valid condition subsequent. the 
estate vested in the grantee does not cease in him, and re-
vest in the grantor ipso facto, but remains unimpaired in the 
grantee until entry, or its equivalent, by the grantor or his 
heirs. For the grantor or his heirs inay waive the right to 
enforce the forfeiture ; and though there has been no express 
waiver, and the estate of the grantee is still liable to for-
feiture, the law, in favor of the vested estate, will not per-
mit its destruction until the right to forfeit has been exer-
cised. 
"The forfeiture, as we have . seen, is not self-executing, 
and the title remains in the grantee until the grantor takes 
appropriate action to have himself re-invested with it; bu~ 
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a ju gment in ejection in his favor will accomplish the pur-
pooa' .. 
In the above cited. case of· F. J. Loive'f'y· v~ Territory of 
Haw ii it was decided that the statute of limitations did not 
begi t~ run against a grantor on the mere happening of a 
conti gency that might entitle him to re-enter. 
W rvelle on Vendors above cited, Vol. 1, Section 446 says: 
'' mere breach of any or all the conditions upon which 
an e tate has been conveyed will not have the effect to re-
vest he title in the .grantor. He has an option to declare 
a_for eiture, but this right he may waive either by express 
act o passive acquiescence. The authorities are unanimous 
in de laring that to render the breach effectual and re-vest 
an e ate forfeited as for conditions broken, requires·. some 
actio on the part of the grantor. If he is not in possession 
he m st make an ·entry, or by some act equivalent thereto 
asser a continual claim, manifesting a determination to take 
adva tage of the breach; if in possession, he must in ·some 
mann r evidence an intent to hold possession by reason of 
the b each. Until this has been "done the grantee holds hi~ 
estat , liable only to be defeated,. but not actually determined 
by a orfeiture. '' . 
2 evlin on Deeds, Sections 959 and 97 4, is to the same 
effect as W arvelle just quoted . 
. A ordingly, if the forfeiture is waived by the grantor 
in ca e of a condition subsequent being broken, the estate 
of th grantee and his interest and possession continue the 
same as before the happening of the contingency and the 
statu e of limitations does not begin to run· against the 
grant r. Many a lease provides that upon the happening 
of on or more contingencies, the lessor shall, at his election, 
have he right to re-enter and insist upon a forfeiture, which, 
also, owever he ma.y waive. As above explained, in cases 
:Of co ditions subsequent, the law gives the grantor this right, 
·altho gh the deed does not contain such ·an elective clause. 
Th same is true o.f delinquency in paying insurance 
premi ms, installments under conditional sales, etc., and 
waive of one occasion or ground of forfeiture, does not pre-
vent i sisting on the same or a subsequent different ground 
of fo eiture. Were it otherwise a 1essor in a very long lease 
could not overlook the least delinquency of a lessee without 
·forfei ing his ·property to the lessee under the statute of 
limita ions. 
M. W. Talbot and T. Talbot v. City of Norfolk. 1 
R. C. Minor on Real Property, Section 560, say~;~: 
"·Such a waiver, it should be observed, operates only on 
previous bre~ches and does not affect the right to take advan-
tage of a subsequent breach. A waiver of future perfor-
mance, such as was discussed in the two preceding sections, 
is not thus to be inferred from a waiver of forfeiture for a 
past breach.'' · 
In )llcKildoe v. Daracott, 13 Grat., p. 285, it is said: 
"The waiver of one forfeiture is of course not a waiver 
of a subsequent forfeiture; and if the act of forfeiture be 
continuing, a waiver of a right of re-entry for one breach will 
not preclude a re-entry for a new or continuing breach. Thus 
a lessor may take advantage of forfeiture occurring de die in.. 
diem, as in case of a neglect to repair, work a mine, or the 
like, continuing from day to day, notwithstanding a previous 
distress for rent, etc.'' . 
In the instant case continuing dttties were imposed on the 
grantee, viz: :first to keep in use· its bridge continuously with-
out an interruption of.more than three years, and, secondly, 
to keep alive the corporation without cessation of its cor.:. 
porate privileges. 
Plaintiffs pray that a writ of error and supersedeas may 
be granted, said judgment reviewed and reversed, judgment 
rendered in favor of plaintiffs, and such other relief granted 
as may be granted to the nature of the case. 
:MINTON W. TALBOT and THOMAS TALBOT, 
June 30, 1928. 
By JAS. G. MARTIN, Oounsel. 
I, J as. G, Martin, counsel practicing in the Supreme· Court 
of Appeals of Vi:rgi:nia, certify that in my opinion sufficient 
matter of error appears in the decision and· record accom-
panying the foregoing petition to make it proper for the same 
to be reviewed by this court. 
JAS. G. MARTIN. 
Writ of error allowed and $up'ersedea$ awarded, Eond, $300.00. . 
Jun. 30, .1928. 
Received July 2, 1928. 
JESSE F. WES.T. 
.J,F.W. 
H. S. J. 
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eas before the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, 
at he Courthouse thereof, on Thursday, the· 8th day of 
Ma ch, in the year 1928. 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that heretofore to-wit: In the 
Oircu t Court aforesaid at the Rules holden for said Court 
on th First ·Monday in March, 1927, came the Plaintiffs, 
Minto W. Talbot and Thomas Talbot, and :filed their dec-
larati n in Edectment against the defendants, City of Nor-
folk, municipal corporation and James Gregory, in the fol- · 
lowin words and :figures: 
Mi ton W. Talbot and Thomas Talbot, plaintiffs; complain 
of th City of Norfolk, a municipal corporation, and James 
Greg ry, defendants, of a plea of trespass, for this, to-wit: 
That eretofore, to-wit, on the first day of January, 1927, 
plaint ffs were possessed in fee simple absolute of a certain 
parce of land described as follows, to-wit: 
Th t certain piece, tract or parcel of land, lying near the 
centr of the City of Norfolk, upon which was formerly the 
tollga e of Indian Poll Drawbridge Company, bounded and 
descr' ed as follows: On the West by Granby Street ex-
tende , formerly known as the Indian Poll Bridge Road, on 
the orth by the land formerly in possession of the Bay 
Shore Terminal Company, and used as· the· site of its power 
house, and on ·the east and south by Lafayette 
~ River, formerly Tanner's Creek. 
And plaintiffs being so possessed of said land, 
defen ants afterwards, to-wit, on said day entered into the 
-same, and the defendants unlawfully withhold from the plain-
tiffs t e possession thereof. · 
Sai two plaintiffs together own the whole of said land 
in fe simple absolute, each owning a one-half undivided 
intere t therein, and this action is for the whole of said 
land. · 
To he da:rp.age of plaintiffs $1,000.00. 
J AS. G. MARTIN, p. q. 
An thereupon the said defep.dants having been duly sum-
mone and having failed to appear, plead, answer or demur·, a 
condi · onal judgment was entered against them. 
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And at another day, to-wit: In the Clerk's Office afore-
.said at the Rules holden for said Court on the third Mon-
day in March, 1927, the said defenda.nts still failing to ap-
pear, plead} answer or demur, the common order was con-
firmed and a writ of enquiry awarded the said plaintiffs. 
And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said on the 11th day of April, 1927: 
page 3 }- This day came as well the plaintiffs, by their 
attorney, .Tames G. Martin, as the defenti/lnts, by 
· their attorney, R. -w. Peatros·s, and thereupon on the motion 
of the said defendants, by their attorney, who pleaded not 
g-uilty. to which the plaintiffs replied generally, it 'is ordered 
that the judgment heretofore entered at the rules be set 
aside, and issue is joined; and on the further motion of the 
said defendants, by their attorney, the said plaintiffs are 
required to file herein a bill of the particulars of their claim; 
and on like motion of the said plaintiffs, the said defendants 
are required to file their grounds of defense herein; and the 
further hearing is continued. 
And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said on the lOth day of October, 1927: · · 
This day came again the parties, by their attorneys, and 
thereupon the said defendants, by their attorney, filed herein 
their written plea of not guilty, to which the said plaintiffs 
replied generally and issue is joined on said plea and with 
leave of Court the said defendants filed herein their special 
plea of the Statute of Limitations, and the further hearing 
is continued. 
The following are the Plea of Not Guilty and Special Plea 
:filed by leave of the foregoing order: 
page 4 }- PLEA OF NOT GUILTY. 
The said defendants, by their attorney, come and say that 
they, the said defendants, are not guilty of unlawfully with-
holding the premises claimed by the plaintiff in the declara-
tion filed in this action and of this the said defendants 
put themselves upon the country. 
OITY OF NORFOLK AND .TAMES GREGORY, 
By Counsel. 
R. W. PEATROSS, 
D. TODD WOOL, p. d. 
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SPECIAL PLEA, 
these said defendants, by their attorney, come and say 
he said supposed cause of action in the said declara~ 
entioned did not accrue to the said plaintiffs at any 
time ithin fifteen (15) years next before the commencement 
of t is sliit. And this the said defe:ndants are ready to 
verif -
CITY OF NORFOLK AND JAMES GREHORY, 
. By Counsel. 
R. • PEATROSS, 
D. 'r IDD WOOL, p. d. 
A d at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
. said on the lOth day of December, 1927: 
page 5} This day came again as well the plaintiffs, by 
their attorney, James G. Martin, as the defendants, 
by t eir attorney, R. W. Peatross, and thereupon the said 
pla · . tiff moved the Court to strike out the defendants' special 
plea heretofore :filed herein, which said motion having been 
full heard and maturely considered by the Court is sus:. 
tain d and said special plea stricken out, to which action 
of t e Court in striking out said special plea the said de-
fend nts, by their attorney, duly excepted. And thereupon 
the efendant, the City of Norfolk, filed herein its affidavit 
den 'ng the ownership by the said plaintiffs of the parcel 
of I nd in controversy herein, and the further hearing is 
cont nued. -
T e following is the affidavit :filed by leave of the fore-
goin order: 
AFFIDAVIT. 
Stat of Virginia, 
Ci y of Norfolk, to-wit: 
T is day personally appear~d before me JNO. D. COR-
BE L, a Notary Public in and for the City of Norfolk, in 
the tate of Virginia, I. WALKE TRUXTUN, City Man-
of the City of Norfolk, who, after being duly sworn, 
ses and says as follows: · 
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That he denies that Minton W. Talbot and Thomas Talbot 
were, on the first day of J ari.uary, 1927, or at any other time, 
the owners of that certain parcel of land described in the 
declaration filed by .the plaintiffs in the action of Minton 
W. Talbot and Thom~s Talbot vs. the City of Nor-
page 6 ~ folk and James Gregory, as follows, to-wit: · 
That. certain piece, tract or parcel of land, lying near the 
centre :of the City of Norfolk, upon which was formerly the 
tollgate of Indian Poll Drawbridge C.ompany, bounded and 
'described as follows: On the West by Granby Street ex-
tended, formerly known as Indian Poll Bridge Road, on the 
north by the land formerly in possession of the Bay Shore 
Terminal Company, and used as the site of its power house, 
and on the east and south by Lafayette River, formerly 
Tanner's Greek. · 
And· the deponent further avers that, to the best of his 
knowledge and belief, the City of Norfolk was, on said date, 
and now is, in possession of said land and is the holder of 
· the·legal title thereto. 
I. WALKE TRUXTUN, 
Qity Manager. 
' Subscribed and sworn to before me, in the City of Nor-
. folk, Virginia, this 18th day of November, 1927. 
JNO. D. CORBELL, 
Notary Public .. 
· And at another day; to-wit: · In the· Circuit Court afore-
said on the 14th day of January, 1928: 
page 7 ~ On· this· day came again the parties, and · the 
whole matter of law and fact having been heard by 
· the Court, without a jury, a jury having been expressly 
waiv~d by all of the parties to the action, and argument of 
counsel having been heretofore heard by the Gourt, and 
the C6urt being of opinion for reasons stated in a written 
opinion in the case of Minton W. Talbot and Thomas Talbot 
·vs. Virginia Electric and Power Company, a copy of which 
is filed herewith as a part hereof, doth decide for the de-
fendant. 
Therefore, it is considered by the Court that the plain-
tiffs ta;ke nothing by their writ, and that the defendant go 
thereo~ without day and recover against the plaintiffs, its 
-------,--------------
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cost y it about its defense expended, to which action and 
rulin of the Court the plaintiffs, by counsel, excepts. 
A the plaintiffs having indicated an intention to apply 
to th Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a writ of 
erro and supersedeas to this judgment, it is ordered that, 
-upon the execution of bond in the sum of one hundred dol-
lars,- conditioned according to law, execution on said judg-
ment be suspended for sixty days pending the application for 
said rit of error and supersedeas. 
T e following opinion of the Court make a part of the · 
reco d by the foregoing order: 
page 8 ~ Virginia: 
In the· Circuit Court of the City 6f Norfolk. 
Min on W. and Thomas Talbot 
vs. 
Vir ·nia Electric and Power Co. 
T is is an action of ejectment in which the plaintiffs claim 
that a certain tract of land conveyed by their ancestor in 
1851 for the erection of a bridge over Tanner's Creek ha.s 
now reverted to them under a clause containing a condition 
sub quent as follows: 
'' rovided, nevertheless, that if the said company shall 
aba don or cease to keep in use its bridge for the space 
oft ree years; or, should the corporate privileges of the said 
cbni any, in any ~anner, cease or be abandoned or forfeited." 
U der the legal . rule that conditions subsequent are not 
fav red in law because they tend to destroy estates, the 
Cou t will never permit an absolute gift to be defeated unles~ 
it b perfectly clear that the very case has happened in which 
it is declared that the forfeiture shall take place. People v. 
Ro eder, 109 Va. 439. 
A d it might well be argued here that the very event in 
con emplation of the parties to the deed was a failure to 
kee- the bridge in use either by abandonment of the bridge 
itse f on the part of the corporation or by a forfeiture of the 
cor orate privileges. The whole purpose in view was the 
· est blishment and maintenance of a bridge so that the grantor 
and those situated like him should have ready access to the 
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City by means of the bridge and not have to go miles around 
by land. 
page 9 r ·But quite apart from this it is reasonably clear 
that both grounds of forfeiture occurred in 1.865. 
The bridge was burned in 1862 and not rebuilt for more 
than . three years, so . the original company ceased to keep 
in use its bridge fOr the space of three years. · 
The second ground of forfeiture is as follows: "·should 
the corporate. privileges of said company in any manner 
cease, or be abandoned or forfeited." And it is recited in 
, the charter of the Drawbridge Company that the franchise 
of the Indian Poll Bridge Co. has been forfeited to the state; 
and it does not affect the clause of forfeiture that it was 
attempted to pass them on to the Drawbridge Co. These 
franchises and privileges of the Indian Poll Bridge Co. were 
quite as much forfeited then as they are now that the Draw-
bridge Co. has ceased to exist. 
Certainly it cannot be said that the privile,qes of the said 
compa;ny (did not) in any manner, cease or be abandoned or 
forfeited. 
If then the plaintiffs invoke the exact terms of this clause 
of reversion in the deed of 1851 they must stand or fall by 
its precise language. .And in my. judgment both grounds of 
forfeiture became available to the grantor in ·1865. He could 
then have brought his action of ejectment. His cause of 
action arose then for the reason that the bridge had been 
burned and not rebuilt in three years and the franchise and 
privileges of· the said company had been forfeited to the state. 
·Under these circumstances the condition subsequent became 
operative and "the said tract of nearly three acres 
page 10 ~ (did) ipso facto revert to and belong to the said 
William H. Talbot, his heirs and assigns". He 
could then have brought his action of ejectment and the 
statute of limitations ran from that time. 
In my opinion the plaintiffs have failed to prove their 
t~tle to this property and judgment should be entered for the 
·defendant. 
A. R. H., 
Judge of said Court. . 
And now at this day; to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said on the 8th d~,ty of March, -1928, the day and year first 
herein above written: 
This day came . again the parties by their attorneys, and 
.. 
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the lain tiffs presented their bill of exc-eptions No. 1 in 
this ase which was duly signed and made part of the record 
in t · s dase, after it duly appeared in WJ;iting that the de-
fend nt had been given proper notice of the time and place 
of p esenting this bill of exceptions. 
T e following is the Bill of Exceptions made a part pf 
the ecord by the foregoing order: · 
page 11 ~ Virginia : 
· In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 1. 
Mint n W. Talbot and Thomas Talbot 
B it remembered that on the trial of this case the same 
evid nee was introduced as in the case of the same plaintiffs 
agai st the Virginia Electric & Power Company, pursuant to 
the ollowing stipulation, and the evidence in that case and 
exhi its therewith, which are this day signed by the Judge 
and ade part of the record in that case, as plaintiff's bill 
of e ceptions No. 1, are hereby, by agreement of counsel, 
ssly made a part of this bill of exceptions in this case, 
as fully copied herein. 
IPULATION. It is stipulated between the parties here-
to t at the Indian Pole Bridge across Tanner's Creek was 
bu ed by the· Confederate forces retiring from Norfolk on · 
Ma 10, 1862, and that it had not been re-built o·n July 23, 
1865 but was built by Tanner's Creek Drawbridge Com-
pan and opened for traffic in September, 1865. 
It is further agreed between the parties hereto that the 
sam evidence and stipulations, except as modified hereby, 
intr dt~ced in the suit of the Talbots against Virginia Elec-
tric Power Company shall be considered as in evidence in 
this case, subject, however, to all proper exceptions thereto . 
and subject to the rig·ht of counsel for either party 
pag 12 ~ to supplement the same on the trial of this case. 
It is stipulated also that James Gregory, one 
of t e defendants was an employe of the City of Norfolk and 
has died .since this suit was. begun and that he has no in-
tere t in the property in his own right at all and that the 
Cit of Norfolk is in posses.sion of the property for which 
this action is brought. 
It is further stipulated that the blue print now produced 
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in evidence shows the property involved in this present suit, 
being shown enclosed in red lines, lying east of Granby 
Street and bounded on the east and south by the river and 
on the north by the property in controversy in the suit of 
Talbot v. Virginia Electric & Power C'ompany, and on the 
west by Granby Street, and marked on the map ''City of 
Norfolk". · 
And the court having heard the evidence, found for the 
defendant, and entered judgment for the defendant, and to 
such :finding and judgment the plaintiffs at the time duly 
objected and excepted on the ground that the decision and 
judgment was contrary to the law and the evidence and with-
out evidence to support it, and moved that judgment be en-
tered for plaintiffs on these ·grounds, but the court over-
ruled each of these motions and entered :final judgment for 
the defendant, to each of which rulings plaintiffs duly ex-
cepted. And the plaintiffs pray that this their bill of excep-
tions No. 1 may be signed and made part of the record which 
is accordingly done in due time this 8 day of March, 1928. 
page 13 ~ Virginia: 
ALLAN R. HANCKEL, 
Judge of said Court. 
In the Clerk'1:1 Office of the Circuit Court of the City of 
Norfolk, on the 17th day of May, 1928. · 
I, Cecil M. Robertson, Clerk of the aforesaid Court, hereby 
certify that the foregoing transcript includes the papers 
:filed, and the proceedings had thereon in the case of Minton 
W. Talbot and Thomas Talbot, plaintiffs, against The City 
of Norfolk, a municipal corporation and James Gregory, 
defen4ants, lately pending iri our said Court. 
I further certify that the same was not made ·up and 
completed and delivered until the defendants had received 
due notice. thereof and of the intention of the plaintiffs to 
apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a 
writ of error and supersedeas to the judgment herein. 
TESTE: 
CECIL M. ROBERTSON, Clerk. 
By EDW. L. BREEDEN, JR., D. C. 
Fee for transcript, $13.90. 
A Oopy-Teste: 
H. STEWART JONES, C. C. 
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